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45TH CoNGREss, }HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. J REPORT 707,
· 2d Session.
t
Part 2.

LANDS LOCATffiD

MAY

0~

MILITARY WARRANTS IN CERTAIN
STATES.

18, 1878.-Recommitted to the Committee on the Public Lands and ordered to
be printed, to accompany bill H. R. 42:39.

Mr. THOMAS M. PA.'f'I'ERSON, from the Committee on the Public Lands,
by unanimous consent, submitted the following as the
VIEWS OF THE :MINORITY
of the committee on the bill of the House (H. R. 4239) ''to authorize
the Secretary of the Interior to ascertain the amouu t of land located
with military warrants in the States described therein, and for other
purposes":
The biJI provides for the payment of about $3,885,000 to eighteen of
the States, out of the Treasury of the general government. The
amount to be paid to each State ranges from $881,239.11 to the State of
Iowa to $651.25 to the State of Nevada.
Although if the claim now made is just, it has existed against the
government since 1802, and in favor of each of the States named from
the date of their admission into the Union. No claim therefor was ever
presented to Congress until after 1870, and no formal demand has ever
yet beeti made to any department of the government therefor. The
staleness of this claim is sufficient to put the committee on their guard
respecting it, and to cause it to examine well its foundation.
1'hose urging the claim base it upon the obligations of a contract.
They say, that for certain considerations yielded by each of ·the States
to the general government upon their admission into the Union (which
were, that they would not tax public lands, nor tax private lands for
the period of five years, and various other stipulations upon the subject
of taxation), the general g·overnment, by solemn legislation, agTeed to
pay 5 per centum upon all lands disposed of by it, whether sold for cash
or yielded by it to individuals as bounty or compensation for military
services. We contend that no such contract, express or implied, is to
be found upon the statute-books.
The first error into which the claimants faJl is in supposing that the
various States named were, before their admission, in a condition to
dictate the terms under which they would enter the Union. We know,
from the history of the admitted States, that they each sought the benefits of admission, and appeared before Congress in their Territorial
form praying for it; and Congress, in granting their prayer, fixed the
terms. It said to all, '" If you come in you must not tax the public
lands"; to some, "You must not tax private lands for five years after
date of entry"; to others, "You must not tax the property of non-resi·
dents at a higher rate than that of your own people," &c.
These stipulations were not in the shape of exactions for the benefit
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of the general goYernment, except in so far as making the lands of the
government non-taxable might be so considered, but were, in fact, exactions for the benefit of the new States themselves, since these exemptions encouraged immigration, investments, and improvements in a much
greater ratio than would otherwise have occurred, and was iu pursuance
o'f that liberal governmental policy in favor of the pioneer agriculturists,
which bas conduced more directly than any other cause to the present
greatness of these identical States. Wilen, as with some of the States,
Congress requirerl that they silould not tax . lands grantPd for military
services in the war of 1812 for three sears, it was a recognition of services rendered by the nation's defen1lers, which redounded to ti.Je ilonor
and benefit of every citizen and State, and was never considered as a
burden by any of the States within which these veterans settled. In
any event, wilatever the nature of the stipulations was, the State was
at liberty to accept or reject them; and we must all concede tilat the
benefits of being a State within the Union far outweigh the burden imposed by the stipulations. But the general government did not stop
with exactions from the new States; it was liberal with its grants of
material aid and support. The generous gift of lauds for common
schools, for universities, penitentiaries, public buildings, and agricultural
colleges bears witness to its liberality. Its benevolent laws of homestead and pre-emption filled their boders with a hardy and virtuous citizenship, which is at once their pride and glor.v.
·
Among the bounties received by these States upon their admission
was the grant to them of 5 per cent. in money upon the proceeds of the
sales of the public lands within them. It is admitted this percentage
has been paid upon all lands sold for cash, and in some of the States
upon lands contained within Indian reservations, rated at $1.25 per acre,
and also upon lauds sold for scrip, which the government by law agreed
to receive in payment therefor. .But the government has not paid any
sum upon lands located by means of the military land-warrants issued
after the wars of 1812 and with Mexico.
The obligation, if any exists, to pay the percentum upon lands located
by these military warrants must be found in the several acts for the admission of these States into the Union.
The 12th section of the act for the admission of Colorado into the
Union establishes the obligation, if any exists, and is in substance the
same as that nuder which each of the other States makes the demand.
It reads:
SEc. 14. That :five per centum of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands lying
within said State, which shall be sold by the United States subtequent to the admission of the said State into the Union, after deducting all of the expenses incident to
the same, shall be paid to the said State, &c.

As the claimants must rest upon the statute, it is ·of the first importance to understand its meaning. Professor Lieber, in his work on
legal and politi<-al hermeneutics, lays clown this sound proposition, "that
tile very basis of all interpretation is that no sentence or form of words
can have more than one true sense," so that a statute enacted by the
legislature~ like the utterances of an individual or of any other body of
individuals, in the use of words, does so to convey some certain meaning, aud to :find their precise meaning is the whole object of interpretation. (Potter's Dwarris on Stats., &c., 47.)
If words used are so employed that they are capable of two meanings, equally sensible, i~ amounts to such an abwrdity that it is equivalent to havin~ no meaning at
all.-Ibtd.
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Two rules of interpretation uni \Tersally accepted are:
1. It is not permitted to interpret what has no need of interpretation, when an act

is expressed in dear and precise terms; when the sense is manifest and leads to nothing absurd there can be no reason not to adopt the sense which it naturally presents.
2. The popular or received import of words furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of statutes. Courts cannot correct supposed errors, omissions, or excesses of
the legislature.

There are no words in the section of the Uolorado enabling act quoted
above that are not clear and precise. Congress could not have used
language less liable to uncertainty.
What is it, then, that Congress by that act prop)ses to give to the
States~ Five per centum of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands,
which shall be sold by the United States after deducting (from the proceeds) all of the expenses of sale.
When the above worrls are construed together, nothing is left to conjecture; a ''sale," either in law or in the popular sense in which it is
received, has not two meanings. It is defined as "an agreement, by
which one of two cont.racting parties, called the seller, gives a thing and
passes the title to it in exchange for a certain price, in current money, to
the other party, who is crtlled the buyer, who on his part agrees to pay
surh price." (2 Kent, 263.)
ThiR contract (the courts S<ty) differs from a barter or exchange in
this, that in the latter the price or consideration, instead of being paid
in money, is paid in goous or merchandise susceptible of a valuation.
(3 Salk., 157; 12 N. H., 390; 10 Vt., 457.)
To constitute a sale there must be a price agreed upon, and this price
must consist in a sum of money whicll the buyer agrees to pay to the
seller; for ,if paid for in any other way, the contract would be an exchange or barter, and not a sale. (Bouvier, title "Sale.")
No other definition of the word "Si:tle" can be found in any of the
books. Its meaning is as fixed in law as that of any other word in the
English language, and it is as impossible to have a "sale" in law without a money consideration passing to the seller as it is to have a murder
committed without lite being taken.
Having determined what a sale is, it is evident that the ''proceeds"
of a sale can only be "money," and it is 5 per cent. of such money, the
proceeds received by the government from the sales of public lands,
that the States are entitled to receive; and in the absence of other
statutes than the one quoted they are entitled to nothing more and to
nothing less.
Is there a sale of lands by the government where the lands ha,~e been
taken up by the means of the uounty-warrants in question~
It can hardly be claimed that the grant of land.::; to soldiers was in
the strict sense payment for services. The '• pay" consisted of the sum
of money fixed by law to be given monthly to the soldier. The lands
were given in the nature of a bounty or reward for good conduct, faithful services, and earning an honorable discharge. The provisions of
the act of February 11, 1847, fairly shows the considerations upon which
these warrants were issued. It reads:
That each non-commissioned officer, private, * * * enlisted or to be enlisted in
the Regular Army * * * for a period of not less than twelve months, who has
served, or may serve, during the present war with Mexico, and who shall receive an
honorable discharge, or who shall have been killed or died of wounds received or sickness incurred in the course of such service, shall be entitled to receive a certificate or
warrant from the War Department for the quantity of one hundred and sixty acres,
and which may be located, &c.

But call this " compensation for services," ''land received by the soldier under contract for services," yet it was not a sale of land. The
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essential element of a sale, money, was lacking. What did the government receive for the~e lands! Military services alone were the proceeds
Cit' the transaction. How can the government pay to these States five
per centum of the proceeds of such lands~ When we can cut out from
the grand total of military services five per centum to be distributed
among the States, then, and not till then, is it possible to transfer any
of the proceeds of such lands to the States.
The legal and ordinary meaning of words must be overturned ; that
which is not money must be transposed into money, and Congress must
be held to llave solemnly declared that which it did not mean before the
interpretation sought for these statutes can be given to them.
In discussing the statute~ upon which this claim is based, the distinction is lost between a " sale" and a " contract"; the latter may be a
"sale," a "barter," or an "exchange.'' The illustration by tile majority, of one who employs another to work for a given period of time
under an agreement to pay him monthly wages at a given price per
month and forty acres of land, to be co11veyed when the term of service
expires, shows this. After the work was performed, the conveyance of
the land might be enforced or its value recovered in money. But that
is not because there was a H sale" of the land, but because there was a
contract of barter or exchange for it. The courts would enforce the
contract as quickly for the land as for the wages. It is not denied but
that the promise to convey lands for military S('rvices was a contract
which was and should have been carried into effect, but th~re was no
sale of such lands, and the government received no proceeds therefor of
wllich it could pay to the States five per cent. These land-warrants
did not obligate the government to pay one dollar to the holder; they
were part of the machinery by which the soldier or his assigns might
obtain the land the government exchanged for his services. Hence,
that they were assignable counts nothing. That was for the benefit of
the soldier. The government assumed no new liability. Like as in any
other contract, the assignee received the beuefits.
The claimants, compelled to acknowledge that, under the acts of adrnis8ion, the government is not liable, seek to hold it under subsequent
legislation. No law quoted helps them . . The fact that the government
authorized conversion of the revolutionary warrants into scrip, and then
specifically provided that this scrip should be received in paym,ent for
lands, cannot alter the plain letter of the statutes, except in so far ~1s
Congress expressly authorized the exchange of warrants into that which
it would afterward receive as money.
A strict construction of the law might not entitle the States to five
per centum of the value of such lands rated at one dollar and twentyfive cents per acre; but because the government, nuder the peculiar
wording of this statute, and which referred to a very small fraction of
all the warrants issued, saw fit to deal liberally with tht States, is no
reason why all the other statutes should be perverted for the benefit of
those claiming under them. Tbe one fact, if no other, that the government gave to the holders of land-warrants issued by the commouwealth
of Virginia, and under the authority of the Continental Congress, for
military services during the Re\olutioo, the right ·to exchange them for
scrip which would be received as money in payment of lands, is evidence
that all other· bounty warrants were not so considered, but were merely
the evidence of the right of the holder to locate the lands which the
government bad promised to give to soldiers in addition to pay for their
honorable services.
But claimants refer to one other act as some evidence of the intent of
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Congress in the several acts of admission. In 1855 Congress passed an
act authorizing and requiring the Commissioner of the General Land
Office to state an account between the United States and the State of
Alabama, for the purpose of ascertaining what sum or sums of money
were due to said State, under the act of March 2, 1819, for its admission into the Union; and by the act he was required to include in said
account the se,·eral reservations und.e r the various treaties with tlle
Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Creek Indians, within the limits of Alabama,
and pay to said State five per centum thereon.
On March 3, 1867, Congress passed a similar act to settle accounts
with Mississippi, but provided, in addition to tlle clause of settlement as
found in the Alabama act, as follows:
SEC. 2. That the said commissioner shall also state an account between the United
States and each of the other States upon the same principles, and shall allow and pay
to each State such amount as shall thus be found due, estimating all lands and permanent reservations at one dollar and twent.y-five cents per acre.

The above legislation grew out of a state of facts that had no reference
whatever to the claim now presented. The claim, if it exists now,
existed then, and yet neither the States interested, nor the Co!Dmissioner
of the General Land Office, nor Congress, eVf~r claimed or construed it
to mean any such thing. The causes which led to it were as follows:
Congress had provided in their acts of admission that three per cent.
of this five per centum should be expended within the State, for public
improvements, under the direction of the State legislatures, and theremaining two per centum upon public roads, canals, &c., leading into and
through the States, under the direction of the general government.
The States claimed that the general government had never expended.
this two per cent., and hence that the States should receive it. The
government bad also, by treaty with the Indians named, granted the fee
in the reservations to them, in consideration of the relinquishment of
their possessory right in large tracts of country surrendered to the government. Congress, in legislating upon the above facts, concluded to
pay this two per cent. to the States, and also five per centum upon these
reservations, rated at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre. This
was not an interpretation of old laws; it was a new enactment. It gave
to those States new and substantial rights, and the language cannot be
extended beyond its true import.
The 2d section of the Mississippi act simply applies the text of the
first section of that and the Alabama act to the other States. The Commissioner was to state an account with the other States upon the same
principles, and this is the language so emphasized by claimants:
And shall allow and pay to each State snch amount as shall thuB be found du -', estimating all lands and permanent reservations at one dollar and twenty-five cents per
acre.

This clause introduces no new factor into the settlements; it simply
fixes a price at which the lands should be rated, upon which, by previous legislation, they were entitled to the five per centum. ''All lands"
cannot mean all the public lands within the State, because the government would. thereupon be liable to pay to the States not only five per
centum upon lands already disposed of, whether by sale or including
them in permanent reservations, but also upon all other lands yet belonging to the government. It could only have reference to the landsthe permanent reservations expressly mentioned-which the government bad disposed of without fixing a price or making a valuation. The
go,Ternment in substance said, "In addition to five per centum of the proceeds of the sales of lancts, I will give you five per centum on all perma~
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nent Indian reservations; and in determining the gross sum due you
under this agreement, you shall estimate all such lands at one dollar
and twenty-five cents per acre."
That this is the meaning of the act, the solemn action of the States,
their agents, and of Congress have testified.
In construing statutes it is a question to know what the contracting
vowers have agreed upon in order to determine precisely what has been
promised, and bow the parties concerned understood the language when
the act was prepared and accepted. Apply this rule, and we find that,
although millions of acres bad been located by land-warrants, neither
Congress nor the States understood the language to include them within
the five per centum clause.
Hon. Isaac N. Norris, representing the States of Indiana, Illinois, and
Ohio, as counsel in seeking for tho~e States the withheld two per centum,
jn referring to the second section of the Mississippi stcttutes, says:
There were no States upon which the second section could operate bnt Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, and Missouri. Their two per centum, as now pretended by some, had been ap·
propria ted to and absorbed in the construction of the Cumberland road. If the section
was not designed to apply to them, it was not intended to apply to any States, for there
tcere none others upon which it could opemte.

Hons. James F. Green and Frank P. Blair, jr., Senators in Congress
wllen an act similar to the Mississippi act was passed for the State of
.·Missouri, under date of January 20, 1864, claimed no wider operation for
the law than the disputed two per centum.
The Judiciary Committee of the House, in 1871, gave an interpretation of this law in perfect keeping with the above, and which is so clear
that it should set the matter at rest forever. Report No. 40, Fortyfirst Congress, third session, was made by Ron. M. C. Kerr. The Mississippi statute was referred to the Judiciary Committee for construction, and in rendering their construction the report of the committee
thus commences:
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred House resolution No.
:l79, to const1·ue a statute therein named, having had the same under consideration, beg

leave to submit the following report.

Then follows the discussion of the statute. It shows that no other
.states than Ohio, Indiana, and Illmois yet remained for the act to operate upon. All the other States had been settled with. If the present
claim existed and found support in that law, not one of these eighteen
States had been settled with. Was it possible that the Judiciary Committee (even if the States had) could have overlooked a.n item of
$4,000,000 in construing this statute~ And yet the conclu8ion of the
report shows that the committee in construing it entirely excluded it.
The report closes as follows :
The committee, in conclusion, recommend the passage of tbe following joint resolut ion as a substitute for the one referred to them:
JOINT RESOLUTION declaring the true construction of a statute.

B e it resolved by the S enate and House of Representati11es of the United StateB of Ant erica
i n Congress assembled, That the true intent and meaning of the second section of the

act approved March 3, eighteen hundred and fi.fty·seven, entitled HAn act to settle certain accounts between the United States and the State of Mississippi and other States,"
is that all other States, to wit, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, which have not received
the full amount of their five per centum of the net proceeds of the sale of public lands
lying within their respective limits, as mentioned in their several enabling acts, in
money, shall have their accounts stated, both on the public lands and reservations,
and such cash balance as has not been paid to said States allowed and paid.

Nor is this all. The construction of this statute has been given by
the ablest jurists of the country. Among them are Judge B. R. Curtis,
Hon. William M. Evarts, and Ron. Caleb Cushing. Each of these hold,
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in distinct terms, that the 1tiississippi act bas reference only to the two
per centum withheld from the several States.
With all this concurrent testimony on the one side, and no word or
claim until of late years on the other; with Congressional interpretation
and the object to be accomplished by all of these laws in direct conflict
with t}:le claim, we cannot but regard it as entirely without foundation.
The interested States, in their infancy, when they were poor and in need
of funds, when every provocation existed to induce their Senators and
Representatives in Congress to inveigh against the government officers
who would not recognize the claim, and to urge forward such legislation as would secure their pretended rights, never opened their mouths
upon the proposition. But now that they are great and wealthy, and
represented in Congress by a numerous and able body of men, they put
forward a new claim, without law to sanction it, hoping tllat self-interest
will secure for it recognition.
It must be that because prosperity sometimes begets avarice, this new
claim is urged at this late day.
THOMAS M. PATTERSON.
BENONI S. FULLER.
WILLIAM E. SMITH.

